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1 In this sense it is preferable to short-term ﬂows since it permits to avoid an increase in macroeconomic 
instability. See Krkoska (2001) for evidence of  a strong relation between the lack of  FDI, current 
account deﬁcit and economic crises in central European countries.
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The argument that Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) plays a signiﬁcant role 
in promoting growth has provided support for the policy stance emerged 
since the end of  the 80s, when the majority of  developing and transition 
countries started to introduce measures to liberalise trade and to create a 
favourable climate for FDI, adopting in many cases frameworks designed 
to attract foreign investors. FDI, in fact, is considered an important source 
of  growth and ﬁnancing for developing and transition economies as it 
supplements inadequate domestic resources to ﬁnance both ownership 
change and capital formation and helps to replace large amounts of  obsolete 
capital accumulated during years of  central planning. Moreover FDI, as 
stable long-term1 capital inﬂows, is also perceived as a catalyst of  growth 
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since it could bring technology, managerial know-how and skills necessary 
for restructuring ﬁrms and help local enterprises to expand into foreign 
markets. The role of  FDI in transition countries has been emphasized by the 
new growth theory suggesting that it may enhance economic growth not 
only through capital accumulation but, also, by promoting technological 
change and human capital spillovers. Several theoretical arguments and 
abundant empirical evidence support the thesis that TNCs, when transferring 
knowledge capital, create positive spillovers in host countries enhancing 
the marginal productivity of  the capital stock and thereby promoting growth 
In contrast, another strand of  literature (Rodrik 1999; Amsden 2009), 
underlines the disadvantages implied by an indiscriminate openness to FDI 
especially when countries are not well endowed in terms of  human capital, 
when the aim of  the FDI contrasts with the development objectives of  
the country or when foreign afﬁliates operate in enclaves, where neither 
products nor technology have much in common with those of  local ﬁrms. 
In such a case, the costs associated with inward FDI can largely outweigh 
economic gains.
Many studies (mostly cross section) have included a measure of  FDI 
as a potential source of  growth and different hypotheses concerning the 
association between FDI and growth have been tested either by conventional 
measures of  FDI or by incorporating ancillary variables in the estimating 
equation. In this paper, following an extension of  growth theory that 
includes trade and FDI as additional determinants of  growth, we empirically 
examine the role that FDI played, taking into account the inﬂuence of  an 
‘open’ environment, in determining the process of  economic growth. Our 
sample include 252 transition economies of  the Central, Eastern and Southern 
European (CESE) region that in the last decades received substantial FDI 
2 The countries sample includes: Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, 
Moldova, Poland, Romania, Russian Federation, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Tajikistan, Turkey, Ukraine, 
Uzbekistan. Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia and Montenegro and Turkmenistan, originally considered 
in a sample of  28 countries, have been removed since their time series lack data, especially in the 
ﬁrst years of  the period considered. 
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inﬂows. This aggregate includes the 10 new European Union (EU) members, 
Balkans states and former Soviet Union republics.3 Using ﬁxed effects, we 
adopt a dynamic panel data approach from 1990 to 2005. This paper builds 
upon some previous work, ﬁrst of  all, including lags of  involved variables 
(both dependent and independent) to mitigate the problem of  serial 
correlation. Secondly, a ‘general-to-speciﬁc’ approach is implemented and 
formal F-tests are conducted selecting the most parsimonious speciﬁcation 
to deal with the problem of  the omitted variable.
We ﬁnd that exports and lagged FDI have a signiﬁcant positive effect on 
country’ economic growth while this effect is a negative one for current FDI 
suggesting that spillovers require time to occur.
The paper is organised as follows. The next section presents a picture 
of  the FDI and exports trends in the region, focusing on the changes in 
the economic and political environment. Section III brieﬂy surveys the 
theoretical and empirical literature on the topic providing motivation for 
our empirical results. Section IV presents the data set and the methodology 
adopted. Section V illustrates and discusses the main econometric results. 
Section VI summarises and draws conclusions.
��� ��� ������� ������ �� ����
In the years 1989 and 1990, most of  the countries in CESE started the 
transition from communist states to market economies and democratic 
governments. They set out to implement economic and political reforms, 
applying different strategies: increasing openness to trade, privatization of  
previously government-owned production, liberalizing markets and lowering 
the barriers to FDI to varying degrees. For the most part, they had not been 
FDI recipients to any important degree before 1990 but the collapse of  the 
socialist system created several investment opportunities, especially because 
these economies were industrialized and could count on a relatively cheap 
yet highly educated workforce.
3 Although Turkey is not a transition country it is also included in this group for two reasons: ﬁrst of  all, 
because it belongs to the same geographic area and secondly because it will become an EU member.
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Evidence from CESE countries’ data shows that the volume of  trade 
appears to have a clear ascendant trend; total exports from and imports into 
these countries have doubled between 1990 and 2005. FDI inﬂows into these 
25 countries steadily increased from about 3.3 billion USD in 1990 to about 
74 billion USD in 2005, from 0.9 percent to 3.5 percent of  Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) during this period. In 1990, however, the total amount of  FDI 
inﬂows to CESE countries appeared smaller compared to other developing 
countries aggregates; in fact, CESE economies received only 1.6 percent of  
the global FDI inﬂows, while Latin America received 4.6 percent (World Bank 
2006). However, by 2005, FDI inﬂows to CESE increased to 7.5 percent of  the 
global FDI inﬂows while Latin America still received the same percentage 
(World Bank 2006). 
If  we examine (ﬁgure 1) trends in growth of  per capita real GDP, FDI/GDP 
ratio, and growth of  exports –all averaged across the cross-section of  25 CESE 
countries and expressed in percentages– between 1990 and 2005, it appears 
that average growth rate was negative until 1995, showing an ascendant up to 
5% in the 2005. The growth of  export had initially a similar trend appearing 
negative although ascendant until 1993. Then, it ﬂuctuated widely around 
10%. Generally, starting from 1995, the FDI and the GDP per capita growth 
showed a similar behaviour. More in detail, apart from the sharp increase 
in 1992, the FDI share to GDP grows around 4% from 1994 to 2002 slowing 
down from 2003 onwards. One of  the reasons could be that export oriented 
investments were delayed due to the downturn of  the European business 
cycle. Uncertainties related to elections in some of  the target countries like 
the Czech Republic and Hungary also made investors delay new investments 
and acquisitions.
It appeared clearly, looking at the data (ﬁgures 2 and 3), that a large 
proportion of  the total FDI inﬂows is concentrated in a small group of  
CESE whereas most other countries in the region received very limited 
amounts of  FDI inﬂows. There is, in fact, wide variation across the recipient 
countries. For example, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland received, 
in 1994, 50 percent of  total FDI inﬂows in the whole area, while Bulgaria, 
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovak Republic and Slovenia received 
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all together about the 12% of  the total. In 2005, there is an improvement 
in the area in terms of  FDI distribution since 40% of  total FDI inﬂows is 
registered by a larger group of  countries: Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, 
Bulgaria and Romania. Among the other CESE economies (non EU members), 
a considerable percentage of  the total FDI (about 22%) was recorded, in 1994, 
by Kazakhstan, Russian Federation and Turkey; in 2005, the percentage of  
Russian Federation and Turkey doubled and tripled that of  Ukraine. This 
wide variation across the recipient countries can be explained, as many other 
studies have shown, by the fact that the size of  the FDI inﬂows depends on 
the country characteristics (Brenton et al. 1999).
F����� 1
Average per capita ���, ��� /��� ratio and export growth 
in ���� countries, 1990-2005
(percentages)
Source: World Development Indicators (���), World Bank, 2006. 
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F����� 2
��� inﬂows in the new �� members as percentage 
of the total ��� inﬂows in the ���� region
Source: ���, World Bank, 2006. 
F����� 3
��� inﬂows in non- �� members countries as percentage 
of the total ��� inﬂows in the ���� region
Source: ���, World Bank, 2006.
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Foreign Direct Investment is not only strictly related to macroeconomic 
factors (economic fundamentals, market size, natural resources endowment), 
as pointed out by the literature (Lankes and Venables 1996; Bevan and Estrin 
2000; Resmini 2000; Kinoshita and Campos 2001, among others) but also to 
political determinants (such as the degree of  progress in transition reforms, 
political stability), and gravity factors (for example proximity to the European 
Union). FDI inﬂows to these countries, generally low during the ﬁrst half  of  
the ‘90s, have been increasing in line with improvements in all the measures 
of  governance, particularly political stability and progress in transformation. 
When considering the six governance measures calculated by the World Bank4 
(Kaufmann et al. 2006), the average score for the 10 new EU members countries, 
in 1996, was only 0.15 to reach 0.29 in the 2005 (table 1).5 The improvement 
has been limited for the other CESE countries. But in general, we can say that 
there is an enhancement all across the region although, still the overall amount 
of  FDI, in 2005, is modest compared to the size of  the countries. 
Most of  the progress in the governance ratings for CESE countries took 
place between 1996 and 2003. This improvement, intended to permit EU 
accession; in fact, many of  these countries applied for EU membership 
between 1994 and 1996 and most of  them entered the EU in 2004. There was, 
in sum, a clear positive relationship between countries’ average governance 
scores and FDI inﬂows, in the second half  of  the 1990s. Economies with the 
highest governance scores, such as the Czech Republic, Hungary and Estonia 
had also the highest inﬂows while, by contrast, Bulgaria and Romania had 
the lowest governance scores and the lowest FDI inﬂows. Slovenia was an 
outlier, with high governance score but only average FDI inﬂows because 
still the general investment environment is considered risky. Countries 
such as Albania and Macedonia have recently gained more stability but the 
transformation into a market economy is still incomplete and investors 
rarely take the risk to access these countries. 
4 The World Bank issued governance indicators, covering almost a decade until now. 
5 Czech Republic and Slovenia scored higher than Italy and Greece not only in 1996 but also in the 
2005, while Estonia, had scored higher than Greece in 1996 and higher than both in 2005.
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T���� 1
World Bank average of governance ratings, 1996-2005 
and global competitiveness rankings, 2005
Countries
Governance Global competitiveness
Scores Rankings
1996 2005 2005
Albania –0.12 –0.50 100
Armenia –0.68 –0.28 81
Azerbaĳan –0.93 –0.88 62
Belarus –1.10 –1.05
Bosnia –0.52 –0.42 88
Bulgaria –0.29 0.24 61
Croatia –0.23 0.34 64
Czech Republic 0.86 0.82 29
Estonia 0.66 0.99 26
Georgia –0.80 –0.51 86
Hungary 0.76 0.85 35
Kazakhstan –0.72 –0.62 51
Kyrgystan –0.43 –0.94 104
Latvia 0.19 0.69 39
Lithuania 0.30 0.77 34
Macedonia –0.27 –0.40 75
Moldova –0.13 –0.62 89
Poland 0.66 0.52 43
Romania 0.02 –0.13 67
Russia Fed –0.67 –0.67 53
Serbia –1.04 0.54 85
Slovak 0.41 0.79 36
Slovenia 0.96 0.92 30
Tajikistan –1.90 –1.12 92
Turkey –0.24 –0.04 71
Turkmenistan –1.44 –1.44
Ukraine –0.51 –0.44 68
Uzbekistan –1.09 –1.55
New �� members 0.15 0.29 39
Other ���� –0.86 –0.84 76
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Countries
Governance Global competitiveness
Scores Rankings
1996 2005 2005
���� 59
�� 15 1.40 1.39 18
Austria 1.61 1.57 15
Belgium 1.35 1.34 20
Denmark 1.70 1.80 3
Finland 1.68 1.91 2
France 1.24 1.20 12
Germany 1.58 1.48 6
Greece 0.66 0.69 47
Ireland 1.49 1.55 21
Italy 0.76 0.63 38
Luxembourg 1.60 1.76 24
Netherlands 1.72 1.66 11
Norway 1.73 1.73 17
Portugal 1.21 1.14 31
Spain 1.08 1.11 28
Sweden 1.67 1.66 7
United Kigdom 1.60 1.44 9
Sources: Kaufmann et al. (2006) and World Economic Forum (2006).
Inward FDI into the region was also encouraged by a general enhanced 
economic environment. This improvement is measured by the competitiveness 
rankings of  the Global Competitiveness Reports (World Economic Forum 
2006) (table 1). For 2005, the average ranking among the EU-15 was 18, where 
1 represented the highest rank, while the average of  the CESE countries was 
59. Estonia, Czech Republic and Slovenia, were the leaders among the new 
EU member countries, not far behind the EU average, but the other economies 
ranked much lower.6 This improvement in governance and in the general 
T���� 1, continued…
6 In this ranking, Estonia, the Czech Republic and Slovenia outranked both Greece and Italy, and 
were close to Portugal and Spain.
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climate may have helped to attract FDI inﬂows but it could also be that the 
hope of  attracting FDI led to the improvements in governance.
Apart from the difference in terms of  political environment, another 
distinction among country groups in the area can be operated on the basis 
of  the FDI inﬂows character: market-seeking,7 resource seeking,8 and efﬁciency-
seeking.9 The ﬁrst group is composed, for example, of  Poland and Russia 
with large domestic markets and by growing economies such as Croatia, 
Romania and Bulgaria with local markets that attract greenﬁeld investments 
in the consumer goods sector. In Albania and Macedonia investments 
come in, through the privatisation process only to serve the local market. 
The second group comprises countries that attract resource seeking 
FDI because of  their large natural resource endowment such as Russia, 
Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan (oil, natural gas), Tajikistan (aluminium), 
Kirghizstan and Ukraine (uranium). Countries such as the Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Poland, Slovak Republic and Slovenia constituted the third group, 
where many efﬁciency seeking FDI entered because of  the gravity factors, 
in the prospective membership of  the European Union, especially after 
the initial announcement of  the progress of  EU accession. Bulgaria and 
Romania are also included in this set, since FDI enter these countries because 
of  their abundant low wages labour. Among the main investors in these 
countries there are the EU/15 members, whose share is bigger compared 
to the rest of  the region. Over the last few years, the EU/15 members 
have also increased their investments share in Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, 
Moldova and Romania. An exception is constituted by Albania where Italy 
and Greece are responsible for almost all the investments. In the case of  
7 Called also horizontal FDI, as it involves replication of  production facilities in the host country, it 
aims to serve local and regional markets and its main drivers are host market size and host market 
growth.
8 Called also vertical or export-oriented FDI, as it involves a relocation of  parts of  the production 
chain abroad, it aims to acquire resources (low-cost labour, natural resources, raw materials) not 
available in the home country.
9 This type of  FDI aims to gain from the common governance of  geographically dispersed activities 
in the presence of  economies of  scale and scope.
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Italy, neighbourhood relations have also generated higher FDI shares in 
Poland, Romania and Slovak Republic while Germany is investing signiﬁcant 
amounts in Croatia and Romania.
R����� �� ����������� ��� ��������� ����������
The importance of  trade and FDI for economic growth of  transition and 
developing countries has been emphasized in both theoretical and empirical 
literature. On the one hand, apart from the traditional Ricardian argument of  
efﬁciency gain from specialization, there have been several other hypotheses 
put forward to argue how trade may affect growth in developing countries. 
In early works (e.g. Rosenstein-Rodan 1943; Nurkse 1953; Scitovsky 1954; 
Hirschman 1958), exports are deemed to provide the big push to break 
away from the vicious circle of  low level equilibrium in which developing 
countries are often caught. Later, it is argued that exports ﬁll in the foreign 
exchange gap that thwarts imports of  high tech machinery needed to be 
competitive in the market. Endogenous growth theory emphasized the role 
played by exports in enhancing long-run growth by allowing a higher rate of  
technological innovation and dynamic learning from abroad (Lucas 1988; 
Romer 1986, 1989; Grossman and Helpman 1992; Edwards 1992). More 
recently, Coe and Helpman (1995) argue that trade enhances the spillover 
effects of  foreign R&D on domestic productivity. 
On the other hand, the role of  FDI, as a composite bundle of  capital 
stocks, know-how, and technology, has been widely recognized as a growth-
enhancing factor in developing and transition countries. FDI enables host 
countries not only to boost capital formation but also to enhance the quality 
of  the capital stock transferring modern technology and innovation. In fact, 
multinationals are assumed to use best practice technology and management 
which, allow them to compete successfully with local ﬁrms raising the level 
of  competition in the host economy. However, since knowledge possesses 
the characteristics of  public goods, the use of  a new technology by one 
subject does not preclude others from using it, giving rise to R&D and 
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human capital spillovers (Grossman and Helpman 1992).10 Therefore, 
through labour turnover or through backward and forward linkages with 
TNC, indigenous firms can absorb some element of  this knowledge and adopt 
innovative products/processes. Thus, by attracting FDI, host countries hope 
to ‘close the gap’, acquiring product, process and distribution technologies, 
as well as management skills and market access. The theoretical ground to 
support the idea that FDI may enhance economic growth is offered by the 
Endogenous growth framework. This theory, taking into account a variety 
of  factors enabling innovation, such as human capital accumulation and 
technological externalities in the development process, provides a very 
useful tool to analyse how the introduction of  new inputs and technologies 
inﬂuences the production function of  a given economy and how external 
factors affect the research efforts of  economic agents and the diffusion 
of  knowledge (Romer 1993).11 Thus, FDI has not a limited role, as in the 
10 Spillover is deﬁned as the external effects of  R&D that a ﬁrm puts in place for enhancing its own 
productivity compared to the other ﬁrms. Spillovers can occur both within the country and across 
the country (Sjöholm 1997).
11 Romer (1993) underlined that “a developing nation apart from suffering from an object gap due 
to the lack of  valuable objects such as roads, factories, raw materials, can also suffer from an idea 
gap due to the fact that it has not access to the ideas used in the developed economies to generate 
economic value. The notion of  an idea gap include something broader than a simple technology gap, 
some kind of  economic activity that does not take place in the factories but outside. Ideas include 
the innumerable insights about packaging, marketing, distribution, inventory, control, payments and 
information system, transaction processing, quality control and worker motivation that are all used in 
the creation of  economic value in an economy”. In these ideas –based endogenous growth models–, 
‘ideas’ (in the form of  blueprints for new products or new processes) generated by investment in R&D 
lead to new processes and products that are used as inputs in the production of  ﬁnal goods, raising 
productivity (Romer 1990). More importantly, R&D –based innovation– is a crucial determinant of  
the competitiveness of  ﬁrms since it does not exclusively affect the performance of  those undertaking 
these activities but gives rise to important external effects (‘R&D spillovers’). An important element 
of  these external effects is ‘knowledge spillovers’, which take place if  new knowledge generated 
by the R&D activities of  one agent stimulates the development of  new knowledge by others, or 
enhances their technological capabilities. Thus, “an idea gap can be reduced at relatively low cost 
by transmitting ideas and generating gains from trade and FDI shared by the supplier who already 
possesses the knowledge and the recipient”. Since the notion of  an idea gap focuses on the pattern of  
interaction and communication between a developing country and the rest of  the world, it suggests 
that TNCs can play a special role as conduits of  productive ideas ﬂow across national borders (more 
than arms length transactions).
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Solow (1957) model, where it was considered only as additional capital 
with respect to the domestic capital level. As a vehicle of  technology and 
cumulative R&D experience transfer, FDI, on the one hand, contributes to 
the stock of  knowledge (innovations) enhancing the productive capacity 
of  the economy and stimulating economic growth, on the other hand, 
adds to the domain of  social knowledge, generating spillovers and thereby 
promoting further growth. 
However, as Romer writes in his 1990 paper, for endogenous growth 
to happen some important preconditions are necessary among which there 
is openness to trade. Governments can make the recipient economies more 
appealing to foreign investment not only by offering an adequate reward to 
TNCs but, also, by favouring freer trade that may be supportive of  growth 
and technological development. In fact, as Romer et al.(1991) stated, when 
barriers to trade are too high, and new inventions can not cross national 
lines, the incentive to innovate decreases suggesting a role for trade policy. 
There are two dimensions of  the hypothesis that FDI interacts with trade 
having positive effect on growth. Firstly, a more liberal trade environment 
with export-orientation attracts higher level of  FDI inﬂows because it not 
only allows foreign capital to take advantage of  low cost labour in the 
host country but also provides access to a larger market. This, also, leads 
to the output expansion in internationally competitive and export oriented 
product lines. Moreover, the production of  ﬁrms in a liberal trade regime 
is not limited by the size of  the domestic market and has the potential to reap 
economies of  scale through international market penetration (Kohpaiboon 
2002; Nath 2005). Secondly, the neutrality of  incentives,12 associated with 
export orientation allows exploitation of  scale economies, better capacity 
utilization and lower capital-output ratio, making foreign capital more 
productive and permitting the market mechanism effectively indicate the 
country’s comparative advantage (Edwards 1992; Salvatore and Hatcher 
12 A neutral trade regime may be deﬁned as a situation with equal incentives to domestic sales and 
exports. Bhagwati (1973) deﬁned it as a regime where the effective exchange rate for exports equals 
the effective exchange rate for imports: EERx = EERm.
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1991; Feder 1983). Moreover, exports promote technical innovation and 
dynamic learning from abroad and thereby create a more favourable 
environment for externalities and learning from technology spillovers 
associated with FDI (Worth 2004). Thus, inward FDI attracted by a liberal 
trade environment may conform to existing or potential comparative 
advantages in trade. 
In contrast to the mainstream theory, another wide line of  thought 
suggests that FDI may have a negative impact on growth for different 
reasons. Following Amsden (2009), it often transfers capital intensive 
technology inappropriate to match the factor supplies in the host countries 
generating displacing effects (crowd out) and distorting the development 
of  the indigenous industry. Furthermore, the promotion of  patterns of  
demand inappropriate to the level of  development (Cook and Kirkpatrick 
1995), increasing imports, may have an adverse effect on the balance of  
payments as the evasion of  taxes on proﬁt remission through transfer 
pricing (Thirlwall 1999). FDI reduces also the availability of  ﬁnance or other 
factors for local ﬁrms because of  the multinational privileged access to 
these resources imposing a long term cost on the host economy (Agosin 
and Mayer 2000). 
Following the new growth theory paradigm, there have been many 
attempts, over the years, to test the impact of  FDI on host country economic 
growth. The vast literature on the topic shows, however, a contrasting 
evidence. On the one hand, at the macroeconomic (economy wide) level, 
positive effects of  FDI spillovers were reported by Blomström et al. (1994) 
who ﬁnd that, although FDI has a signiﬁcant positive inﬂuence on growth 
rates, this inﬂuence seems to be conﬁned to higher income developing 
countries. De Mello (1999), also, ﬁnds a positive correlation for selected Latin 
American countries but, however, the evidence would seem to suggest that, 
in general, a supportive economic environment is fundamental. In the study 
of  Borensztein et al. (1998) the FDI inﬂows to 69 developing countries in the 
period 1970-89 have a positive signiﬁcant inﬂuence on growth only when 
a certain development threshold level is achieved (in terms of  educational 
attainment). Balasubramanyam et al. (1996), Marino (2000), Kohpaiboon 
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(2002) ﬁnd a positive growth effects of  FDI associated with a liberal 
environment because, echoing an earlier suggestion by Bhagwati (1973), a 
major degree of  openness is likely to provide an appropriate environment 
conducive to learning that must go along with the human capital and new 
technology infused by FDI. Rodríguez-Clare (1996) too, sustained that most 
of  the investment activities which activate technology transfers took place 
in the export-oriented industries and resulted in important scale effects and 
externalities for GDP growth. 
However, a dissenting view is echoed in Rodrik (1999) who argues 
that the effect of  FDI on growth tends to be weak and suggests that much 
if  not most of  the correlation between FDI and a superior performance is 
driven by reverse causality. Hausmann and Fernandez-Arias (2000) also cast 
doubts on the special merits of  FDI. Carkovic and Levine (2002) concluded 
that there is no reliable cross-country empirical evidence supporting the 
claim that FDI per se accelerates economic growth. Blomström and Kokko 
(2003) concluded from their review of  the literature that spillovers are 
not automatic and local conditions inﬂuence ﬁrms’ adoption of  foreign 
technologies and skills.
Coming to microeconomic studies on the Foreign Direct Investment-
growth impact, controversial results are also found. In terms of  positive 
impact, the earliest contributions are the studies by Caves (1974) who examines 
Australian manufacturing and Blomström and Persson (1983) with data 
for Mexican manufacturing industries. Moreover, positive spillovers were 
identiﬁed by many other studies, among which there are: Sjöholm (1999) 
for Indonesian manufacturing, Drifﬁeld (2001) for United Kingdom (UK), 
Chuang and Lin (1999), Dimelis and Louri (2002), and Lipsey and Sjöholm 
(2001) for Taiwan, Greece and Indonesia, respectively. Kokko (1994) 
provided evidence of  a positive relationship between the share of  FDI in a 
manufacturing sector and the level and the growth rate of  the productivity 
of  domestic ﬁrms, since when foreign afﬁliates and local ﬁrms are in more 
direct competition with each other spillovers are more likely to be generated. 
Later Kokko et al. (2001) ﬁnd evidence for positive productivity spillovers 
only from multinationals which located in Uruguay during the import 
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substituting trade regime and no evidence for spillovers of  export oriented 
multinationals. Thus, they argue, multinationals are more likely to rely 
on skills in international marketing or distribution networks rather than 
production technologies, implying that there is less potential for productivity 
spillovers. 
Other studies suggest that spillovers are not signiﬁcant or, that they do 
not take place in all industries. Haddad and Harrison (1993), in a test of  the 
spillover hypothesis for Moroccan manufacturing during the period 1985-
1989, conclude that spillovers do not take place in all industrial sectors. 
Aitken and Harrison (1999) examine ﬁrms data for Venezuela, fail to ﬁnd 
evidence of  economy wide spillovers from the presence of  multinationals. 
Only ﬁrms in neighbouring activities or industries, they argue, are likely to 
be able to take advantage of  spillovers generated by foreign subsidiaries 
because spillover effects tend to be localised. This is particularly true in 
large countries where they are likely to be conﬁned geographically within 
the state or area where the FDI takes place. Cantwell (1989) claims that 
technology spillovers take place mainly where local ﬁrms are initially 
relatively strong, that large domestic ﬁrms located close to foreign ﬁrms tend 
to exhibit higher growth rates of  factor productivity particularly in sectors 
where levels of  technology are relatively low. These results would suggest 
that, ﬁrst of  all, the economy-wide spillover effect of  a given volume of  
FDI is likely to be greater in geographically small countries relative to large 
countries and, secondly, that spillovers in large countries are relatively more 
sensitive to the competitive and learning capabilities of  domestic ﬁrms and 
to the technological gap between domestic ﬁrms and TNC because, ceteris 
paribus, FDI in large countries is more likely to be oriented to the domestic 
market than in small countries. This latter point suggests that it is plausible 
to expect that the effect of  spillovers have a greater variation across large 
countries compared to small ones (Yamin et al. 1999). Kathuria (2000) 
analysing panel data for Indian manufacturing, ﬁnds that the evidence for 
spillovers is weak and if  inter industry spillovers occur it is rather implausible 
that such spillovers extend very far beyond the industry of  the subsidiary. 
Kokko (1996) in a study of  Mexican manufacturing, argues that positive 
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spillovers are less likely in industries with highly differentiated products and 
large economies of  scale. Foreign and local ﬁrms may use entirely different 
technologies when products are differentiated and economies of  scale may 
allow the foreign afﬁliates to crowd out local ﬁrms from their segments of  
the market. He points out that, ﬁrst of  all, spillovers should not be expected 
in all kinds of  industries and secondly, that they may not occur if  foreign 
afﬁliates operate in enclaves, where neither products nor technology have 
much in common with those of  local ﬁrms. From this comes that spillovers 
are not automatic consequences of  FDI and they are less likely in industries 
where high foreign market shares and large productivity gaps between 
foreign and local ﬁrms coincide. Spillovers are not determined only by 
the extent of  foreign presence but rather by the simultaneous interactions 
between foreign and local ﬁrms, in other words by competition. Only the 
existence of  a competitive environment forces domestic ﬁrms to imitate 
the better technology and thus productivity increases may materialise. This 
may explain why spillovers do not appear in many cases. 
With speciﬁc reference to transition economies, most of  them are 
middle-income countries known for their high level of  education and for 
their strong cultural and economic relationship with European countries. 
Therefore, one can imagine that they have a sufﬁciently good capacity to 
absorb knowledge spillovers. Nonetheless, the evidence concerning intra-
industry spillovers in such countries is also inconclusive. Kinoshita and 
Campos (2002) ﬁnd positive impacts of  foreign investment in 27 Central 
Eastern countries over the period 1990-98 and also Sohinger (2005) shows 
that FDI with its growth-enhancing effects, has played a signiﬁcant role 
in transition economies. Nath (2005), using panel data analysis for 13 
transition countries, ﬁnds that the interaction between trade and FDI seems 
important for growth. Rodrik et al. (2004) ﬁnd that non-economic factors, 
as institutions, matter for economic growth in these countries; similarly 
Bevan and Estrin (2000) ﬁnd that political and legal issues inﬂuence foreign 
investment. Yudaeva et al. (2003) show that this effect is positive in the case 
of  Russian ﬁrms, Javorcik and Spatareanu (2005) and Damijan et al. (2003) 
ﬁnd positive spillovers in Romania while, together with Djankov et al. 
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(2000) and Konings (2001), observe negative effects for Bulgaria and 
Romania and no effect in Poland. 
Despite the numerous alleged beneﬁts attributed to foreign direct 
investment, what, clearly, the research shows is that spillovers vary 
systematically between countries and that the positive effects of  FDI are likely 
to increase with the growing level of  local capabilities and competition and 
also, with other factors that contribute to create a favourable environment. In 
sum, a clear signiﬁcant positive impact of  FDI on host countries’ economic 
growth depends on local conditions. Finally, it is worth noting that the 
contrasting results could be due to the fact that, except for some recent 
studies that employed panel techniques, many of  the others have relied upon 
cross-section methods to which several methodological shorthcomings are 
associated. Thus, the presence of  diverging estimates could also be due to 
econometric issues13 and to differences in the sample selection procedure. 
D��� ��� ����������� 
Data collection 
In this paper we use macro-level data14 since, as Blonigen (2001) and Lipsey 
(2002) point out, they are more suitable for capturing wider spillovers on 
the host economy, such as those created by backward and forward linkages 
with domestic ﬁrms. We collected time series data, for the period 1990-2005, 
13 One problem with the interpretation of  these studies is the difﬁculty of  disentangling the direction 
of  causation; in other words, was an economy growing faster than another because the level of  FDI 
was higher or was the rate of  FDI higher because the economy was growing faster? To the extent 
to which factors like the available stock of  infrastructures, the market size, the presence of  skilled 
labour, etc. are recognized to be fundamental determinants of  foreign capital inﬂows to developing 
countries, we should expect that growth itself  is conducive to higher levels of  inward FDI. This 
means that a positive correlation between FDI ﬂows and growth says nothing about the underlying 
causal relationship. Even when a researcher takes care to account for the endogeneity bias, it is not 
easy to ﬁnd suitable instrumental variables, that is variables which are correlated with FDI ﬂows but 
not with growth.
14 Data at the micro level were not available for the whole countries sample.
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from the World Development Indicators (WDI) of  the World Bank. The 
use of  a unique data source, in our opinion, should guarantee greater data 
homogeneity although we are aware that the World Bank dataset presents 
many limits in terms of  data accuracy. Using the data we constructed the 
following variables for the empirical analysis. The growth rate of  per capita 
real GDP15 is used as the dependent variable (GDPCG) in the growth equation.16 
The explanatory variables are: the growth rate of  exports17 (EXPG), used as 
measure of  openness, the FDI inﬂows ratio to GDP18 (FDI) and the Gross Fixed 
Capital Formation share of  GDP19(GFCF), used respectively as measures of  the 
foreign and the domestic investments. The summary descriptive statistics 
of  the relevant variables (GDPCG, GFCF, FDI, EXPG) are presented in table 2 
which shows a large heterogeneity in the data. For example, in Armenia, 
FDI has a minimum value of  0.06 and a maximum value of  348, while in 
Belarus the values are 0.04 and 3.66 respectively; for the same countries 
the GDP per capita growth minimum and maximum values are –40.76, 14.4 
and –11.59, 12.01. 
15 The World Development Indicators deﬁnition of  GDP per capita growth (annual %) is: Annual 
percentage growth rate of  GDP per capita, based on constant local currency. GDP per capita is gross 
domestic product divided by midyear population.
16 There have been studies that use per capita real GDP (mostly in logarithms) as the dependent variable, 
see Berg et al. (1999) and Cernat and Vranceanu (2002). Since our study is primarily motivated by 
a variant of  the growth theory, the dependent variable is deﬁnitely the growth rate of  per capita 
real GDP.
17 The WDI deﬁnition of  exports of  goods and services (annual % growth) is as follows: annual 
growth rate of  exports of  goods and services based on constant local currency. Aggregates are 
based on constant 2000 U.S. dollars.
18 The WDI deﬁnition of  Foreign Direct Investment net inﬂows (% of  GDP) is as follows: Foreign 
Direct Investment is the net inﬂow of  investment to acquire a lasting management interest (10 
percent or more of  voting stock) in an enterprise operating in an economy other than that of  the 
investor. It is the sum of  equity capital, reinvestment of  earnings, other long-term capital, and short-
term capital as shown in the balance of  payments. This series shows net inﬂows in the reporting 
economy and is divided by GDP.
19 The WDI deﬁnition of  Gross Fixed Capital Formation (% of  GDP) is: Gross Fixed Capital Formation 
(formerly Gross Domestic Fixed Investment) includes land improvements; plant, machinery, and 
equipment purchases; construction of  roads, railways, schools and hospitals. 
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The general model we use to investigate the role of FDI and exports on 
economic growth is derived from a production function framework:
Y = g (F, K, X)
where Y is GDP per capita growth and g is a linear function of domestic 
investment (K), Foreign Direct Investment (F) and exports growth (X). 
FDI is included in the production function in order to capture externalities, 
learning by watching and spillover effects since it inﬂuences the growth 
process directly, by increasing the stock of  physical capital in the recipient 
economy, and indirectly, by promoting technological change and inducing 
human capital development. Domestic investment is included as explanatory 
variable since the role of  capital accumulation in the growth process has 
been stressed in early works (Harrod 1939), but also in the neoclassical 
growth model out of  the steady state (and also in the steady state if  there 
is a link between capital accumulation and technical progress). Exports is 
also introduced, as an additional factor input, into the production function, 
following a large number of  empirical studies which investigate the export-
led growth hypothesis (Feder 1983; Balassa 1985; Salvatore and Hatcher 
1991; Greenaway and Sapsford 1994; Thirlwall 1999) since export orientation 
leads to higher factor productivity because of  the exploitation of  scale 
economies and better utilisation of  capacity; furthermore, it provides access 
to international market and determines a higher rate of  innovations. In 
sum, considering a large empirical literature, we can say that, in the broadest 
sense, these are key variables.
We use panel data estimation techniques (Baltagi 2002) with country-
speciﬁc ﬁxed effects for our empirical analysis although time invariant initial 
conditions have been shown to be important for growth in general (Barro 
1991) and for transition economies in particular (de Mello 1997; Berg et al. 
[1]
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1999).20 However, given the fact that the determinants of  growth in our 
model may take more than one year to fully exert their impact on growth, 
we use a dynamic speciﬁcation, which includes r lags for each explanatory 
variable, plus possible effects of  previous growth on actual growth. We 
proceeded from a general dynamic speciﬁcation to a more parsimonious one 
by using appropriate tests on the degree of  signiﬁcance of  each explanatory 
variable. 
Then the general form of  the model is represented by the following 
equation:
y k f x yit i j it j
j
r
j it j j it j j it j it
j
r
j
r
j
= + + + + +−
=
− − −
==
∑ ∑∑α γ ψ ζ λ ε
0 10=
∑
0
r
where αi are the individual (country) effects, εit are idiosyncratic errors, γ, ψ, ζ 
are the parameters of  interest, r = 2 and i = 1,2…25, t = 1990, …, 2005.
Among various issues and concerns about this model, the following 
have been formally addressed. First, although country ﬁxed effects take care 
of  time invariant country-speciﬁc factors, the model may still suffer from 
omitted variable problems if  some important ‘time-variant’ control variables 
are not included. Moreover, some of  these variables may be mutually 
correlated. Thus, while the exclusion of  relevant variables may lead to the 
omitted variables problem, inclusion of  them may give rise to the problem 
of  collinearity. Besides, geographic contiguity and similarity in terms of  
political systems make it likely that some common factors can affect these 
countries. The obvious drawback of  including many variables, given the 
small dimension of  the time sample, is the weakness of  the estimates. This 
is the main reason that leads us to select a parsimonious model. Second, 
given the differences in terms of  growth experiences among the selected 
20 However, previous studies (Berg et al. 1999) have argued that the effects of  these initial conditions 
taper off  as time passes. This could be another reason why they may be excluded in investigating 
long run growth.
[2]
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economies, one would expect, as appears in the descriptive statistics reported 
in table 2, that a remarkable variance both in time and across countries will 
affect the reliability of  the results. This heterogeneity across country is also 
conﬁrmed by the Burtlett test. 
R������
First of  all, we estimate for the whole country and time sample, a dynamic 
model with two lags for both the dependent and the independent variables. 
The model has been estimated using 3 different methods. The ‘general-to-
speciﬁc’ approach of  model selection (Hendry 1995) leads to the elimination 
of  the second lag, leading to results in table 3. Columns include coefﬁcient 
estimates, standard errors, t-statistics and relevant diagnostics statistics 
obtained from the three estimation methods used. Column 1 includes 
estimates obtained from a Generalized Least Squares (GLS) estimation 
method that corrects for cross-sectional heterogeneity by using estimated 
cross-section residual variances as weights. In column 2, we present the 
Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) estimates21 that corrects for both 
cross-sectional heterogeneity and cross-sectional correlation by using 
estimated cross-section residual variance-covariance weights. Column 3 
contains weighted 2SLS estimates to take into account the possibility that 
some of  the right-hand side variables could be correlated with the error 
terms and also to consider the presence of  heteroskedasticity.
The results appear analogous under alternative estimation methods; 
apart from the the domestic investment (GFCF) coefﬁcient that is signiﬁcant 
only in SUR and 2SLS estimates, the other coefﬁcients are signiﬁcant even if  
some of  them not always have the expected sign. It should be noted that the 
presence of  heteroskedasticy is conﬁrmed by the White test on GLS residuals 
(not reported here). Furthermore, the Hausman test we conduct identiﬁes 
endogeneneity (not reported here) suggesting using the 2SLS method.
21 Although we ﬁnd little evidence of  cross-sectional correlation, we present the SUR results for 
comparison.
SAPIENZA.indd   40 15/02/2010   11:37:13
 F������ D����� I��������� ��� ������ �� ���� 41
T���� 3
��� per capita, export growth rate and ��� to ��� ratio: 
ﬁxed eﬀects panel estimates for 25 ���� countries
Sample period: 1990-2005 
Estimated parameter (standard error) and t-statistic 
Dependent variable: growth rate of per capita real ���
Independent variables ��� ��� 2���
C 5.12*** 2.03**
(0.96) (0.76)
5.28 2.67
��� per capita growth rate (–1) 0.42*** 0.39*** 0.47***
(0.03) (0.01) (0.03)
13.2 27.04 15.1
��� to ��� ratio –0.10*** –0.10*** –0.08***
(0.01) (0.00) (0.01)
–9.21 –32.6 –6.68
��� to ��� ratio (–1) 0.03*** 0.04*** 0.05***
(0.01) (0.00) (0.01)
2.96 10.0 4.29
���� to ��� ratio 0.04** 0.14**
(0.02) (0.06)
2.14 2.36
���� to ��� ratio (–1) –0.15*** –0.15*** –0.17***
(0.04) (0.01) (0.06)
–3.42 –7.99 –2.87
Export growth rate 0.12*** 0.13*** 0.12***
(0.01) (0.00) 0.01
7.71 27.7 7.82
Export growth rate (–1) 0.03***
(0.004)
7.62
R2 0.73 0.60 0.66
Adjusted R2 0.70 0.56 0.65
�� statistics 2.14 1.97 2.06
H Durbin 0.13 0.05 0.11
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We observe that previous GDP growth exerts always a positive inﬂuence on 
actual GDP growth. As for FDI, the lagged coefﬁcient is signiﬁcant and positive 
while the current one is signiﬁcant but negative. This could be accounted for 
the spillover effects from FDI in terms of  know-how and technology, which 
require time to arise. Once the FDI enters a host country, the ﬁrst effect could 
be a crowding out of  the local ﬁrms with a consequent negative effect on 
growth. Moreover, the negative sign of  FDI can also depend on the nature 
of  the data. In fact, GDP growth can take both positive and negative values, 
while FDI, measured as ratio to GDP, is a variable with only positive values, 
then a negative correlation can arise between the two variables, especially with 
reference to the ﬁrst years of  the dataset. A further reason could be the low 
data quality that affects particularly the initial part of  the time sample as 
shown in ﬁgure 1. The current domestic investment variable (GFCF) appears 
to exercise a positive effect in the SUR and 2SLS estimates while the lagged 
one shows a negative sign indicating the presence of  some problem. What 
we said for FDI about data quality applies also to this case. Regarding the 
current and lagged export growth variable, this plays a positive and signiﬁcant 
role in the growth of  GDP, in all estimation methods (except the lagged 
coefﬁcient in GLS and 2SLS estimates), conﬁrming what has been suggested 
by the theoretical literature. In other words, the growth of  export determines 
an increase in total factor productivity due to the exploitation of  scale 
economies, and also an improvement in the trade balance providing access 
to international markets.
Among several diagnostic statistics on the residuals, we just report the R2 
and the Durbin-Watson test (DW). These show similar values across the 
estimation methods employed, suggesting the robustness of  the estimates 
and accepting the null hypothesis of  no ﬁrst order autocorrelation in the 
residuals, even if  the inclusion of  the lagged dependent variable requires 
a careful interpretation of  this test. In fact, since we introduced lagged 
dependent variables in the relation to be estimated, the DW statistic could 
be distorted towards 2. To check this problem we use the H Durbin test.
As we argued, a considerable heterogeneity in terms of  country size, 
degree of  openness, political stability, macroeconomic development, natural 
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resource endowment, and so on, characterises our CESE countries sample. 
This diversity also appears when we look at the trend of  the economic 
variables in different countries respectively. For example, ﬁgures 4 and 5 refer 
to Belarus and Czech Republic; GDP growth in Belarus was negative (about 
–10%) until 1995, then it sharply grew in the following two years (+10%) 
and it rested around 8% for the remaining years. In the Czech Republic 
instead, the GDP increased from –10% to +5% between 1991 and 1995, 
then it sharply dropped to zero and from 1998 onwards it slowly started 
to raise to +5% for the rest of  the period. In Belarus, the FDI is practically 
null for the whole period considered, while in the Czech Republic it slowly 
grows from zero to +10% until 1998, to fall, after 2002, around +5% for 
the rest of  the period. Since this great heterogeneity can affect the results 
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Belarus: ��� per capita growth, export growth, ��� and ���� ratio on ���
Source: ���, World Bank, 2006. 
SAPIENZA.indd   43 15/02/2010   11:37:13
44 E����� S�������
in terms of  the expected signs of  the parameters (especially of  FDI), to 
verify this hypothesis we estimate the model for a sample composed only 
by the 10 new EU members. These countries seem more homogeneous 
because they experienced the same accession procedures and the related 
convergence policies. The results are shown in table 4 where lagged GDP 
growth and exports appear clearly to inﬂuence actual GDP. Current and 
lagged FDI coefﬁcients are signiﬁcant only in the SUR estimate while domestic 
investment (GFCF) is always signiﬁcant and positive although the lagged 
coefﬁcient continues to appear signiﬁcant but negative. This unexpected 
result may be due not only to the poor quality of  the data that particularly 
affects the beginning of  the time sample but, also, to the decrease in the 
degree of  freedom due to the unit sample reduction. 
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T���� 4
��� per capita, export growth rate and ��� to ��� ratio: 
ﬁxed eﬀects panel estimates for 10 ���� countries
Sample period: 1990-2005
Estimated parameter (standard error) and t-statistic 
Dependent variable: growth rate of per capita real ���
Independent variables ��� ��� 2���
C 2.25 –1.94
(2.23) (1.71)
1.01 –1.13
��� per capita growth rate (–1) 0.32*** 0.18*** 0.45***
(0.05) (0.03) (0.06)
5.56 5.02 6.61
��� to ��� ratio 0.08**
(0.04)
2.00
��� to ��� ratio (–1) 0.12**
(0.04)
2.60
���� to ��� ratio 0.33** 5.60** 0.14**
(0.12) (0.07) (0.07)
2.62 2.14 1.93
���� to ��� ratio (–1) –0.37*** –0.37***
(0.11) (0.07)
–3.22 –5.28
Export growth rate 0.14*** 0.13*** 0.10***
(0.02) (0.01) 0.03
6.13 8.00 2.92
Export growth rate (–1)
R2 0.69 0.64 0.45
Adjusted R2 0.65 0.59 0.44
�� statistics 1.94 1.49 2.19
H Durbin 0.39 0.99 0.07
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Another estimation of  the model is performed using a sample that includes 
the 15 CESE countries not members of  the EU (table 5). Again in these estimates, 
lagged GDP and current and lagged exports coefﬁcients are in general positive 
and signiﬁcant. The lagged FDI appears also highly signiﬁcant and positive 
while the current FDI coefﬁcient although it is highly signiﬁcant does not 
have the expected sign probably because, as we said before, it takes time to 
see spillover effects from a FDI activity. Regarding domestic investment the 
current coefﬁcient appears signiﬁcant only in 2SLS estimates while the lagged 
one is always negative and signiﬁcant (except in 2SLS estimates). The previous 
comments on the nature of  the data and country heterogeneity apply also 
to this case. 
A further hypothesis we veriﬁed is whether the lack of  data, particularly 
relevant in the ﬁrst years of  the period considered, can affect our results. In 
order to test it, we estimated the model considering a shorter period, 1993-
2005. When we considered the full countries sample (table 6), no signiﬁcant 
improvement in the estimates appears. Lagged FDI are always positive and 
signiﬁcant as export and the lagged GDP; current domestic investment 
is signiﬁcant and positive in SUR and 2SLS estimates while the lagged GFCF 
coefﬁcient is signiﬁcant but negative as current FDI (that continue to show 
the wrong sign). The estimates 1993-2005 (not reported here) relative to the 
‘10 new EU members sample’ and those relative to the ‘other CESE sample’ 
are also not signiﬁcantly improved. 
C����������
The objective of  this paper was, following an extension of  growth theory, 
to evaluate empirically the impact of  FDI on the rates of  economic growth 
of  25 transition economies (CESE) for the period 1990-2005. The basic 
motivation for this study is that the empirical literature has had difﬁculties in 
establishing the result predicted by economic theory, namely that the effect 
of  FDI on host country growth is positive and statistically signiﬁcant. These 
countries have witnessed substantial increase in trade and FDI during the 
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T���� 5
��� per capita, export growth rate and ��� to ��� ratio: 
ﬁxed eﬀects panel estimates for 15 ���� countries
Sample period: 1990-2005
Estimated parameter (standard error) and t-statistic
Dependent variable: growth rate of per capita real ���
Independent variables ��� ��� 2���
C 4.41*** 1.54***
(1.18) (0.46)
3.71 3.33
��� per capita growth rate (–1) 0.55*** 0.45*** 0.51***
 (0.04) (0.02) (0.04)
 13.60 15.65 10.9
��� to ��� ratio –0.10*** –0.10*** –0.09***
 (0.01) (0.00) (0.01)
 –9.39 –17.76 –5.67
��� to ��� ratio (–1) 0.05*** 0.04*** 0.06***
 (0.01) (0.00) (0.01)
 4.29 6.12 3.69
���� to ��� ratio 0.14***
 (0.06)
 2.36
���� to ��� ratio (–1) –0.13** –0.14**
 (0.05) (0.03)
 –2.39 –4.46
Export growth rate 0.11** 0.13*** 0.12***
 (0.02) (0.00) (0.02)
 5.40 14.32 4.87
Export growth rate (–1) 0.04***
 (0.01)
 4.20
R2 0.76 0.62 0.56
Adjusted R2 0.73 0.58 0.55
�� statistics 2.47 2.12 2.70
H Durbin 0.89 0.06 1.37
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T���� 6
��� per capita, export growth rate and ��� to ��� ratio: 
ﬁxed eﬀects panel estimates for 25 ���� countries
Sample period: 1993-2005
Estimated parameter (standard error) and t-statistic
Dependent variable: growth rate of per capita real ���
Independent variables ��� ��� 2���
C 5.17*** 2.04***
(0.93) (0.70)
5.53 2.88
��� per capita growth rate (–1) 0.41*** 0.40*** 0.45***
(0.03) (0.01) (0.03)
12.00 30.22 13.8
��� to ��� ratio –0.10***
(0.00)
–35.51
��� to ��� ratio (–1) 0.03** 0.04*** 0.04***
(0.01) (0.00) (0.01)
2.64 11.47 3.80
���� to ��� ratio 0.05*** 0.13**
(0.01) (0.05)
2.79 2.28
���� to ��� ratio (–1) –0.16** –0.16*** –0.16***
(0.04) (0.01) (0.05)
–3.79 –9.12 –2.92
Export growth rate 0.11*** 0.13*** 0.10***
(0.01) (0.00) 0.01
7.43 31.49 7.00
Export growth rate (–1) 0.03**
(0.00)
2.79
R2 0.70 0.60 0.64
Adjusted R2 0.67 0.56 0.64
�� statistics 1.97 1.97 1.92
H Durbin 0.05 0.03 0.15
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period examined. Applying a ﬁxed effects dynamic panel estimation method 
to a data set that ranges from 1990 to 2005, this paper ﬁnds that lagged FDI 
has a signiﬁcant positive effect on country’ economic growth while this effect 
is a negative one for current FDI. This could be explained with the fact that 
spillover effects from FDI in terms of  know-how and technology, require 
time to arise but could also be determined by the great heterogeneity that 
affect the data set. As expected, lagged GDP growth exert a strong inﬂuence 
on current GDP growth; the estimates show also a signiﬁcant positive effect 
of  exports. The same can be said for current domestic investment, although, 
the lagged coefﬁcient shows, in most estimates, a negative unexpected sign 
suggesting the presence of  some problems in the data. 
When considering sub-samples as the ‘10 new EU members’ and the ‘other 
CESE non EU members’, so as to reduce the great heterogeneity of  the data, 
the results do not appear to improve in terms of  the expected signs of  the 
parameters but rather (as in the case of  the ‘10 new EU members’) the FDI 
variable becomes not signiﬁcant. The same can be said in the case of  the 
‘shorter period sample’ we estimated.
In sum, our results show that lagged FDI is a crucially important 
explanatory variable for growth in transition economies together with 
previous GDP growth, domestic investment and export growth. These 
estimates seem robust after correcting for endogeneity and omitted variable 
bias in all estimation methods (GLS, SUR, 2SLS) although the great data 
heterogeneity suggests some caution. 
Further research can investigate different country samples and different 
causal linkages. From an econometric point of  view, it is a promising 
approach to employ, in the 2SLS, a different set of  instrumental variables 
compared to those used in this paper in order to check the endogeneity of  
explanatory variables. In addition, the analysis of  Granger causality shall 
contribute to a better interpretation of  potential bi-directional interference 
between FDI and economic growth.
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